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# Latin America Report

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## JLP INAUGURATES 'LA CANGREJERA' PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX

Mexico City EXCELSIOR in Spanish 30 Apr 81 pp 30-A, 31-A

[Text] Yesterday, the president of the republic, Jose Lopez Portillo, turned over to Mexico one of the most important petroleum works of his administration: the "La Cangrejera" Petrochemical Complex, the largest unified project of this type ever built in the world, at a cost of 26.082 billion pesos. On this occasion he was accompanied by the general director of Mexican Petroleum, engineer Jorge Diaz Serrano.

A total of 20 integrated plants comprise this great industrial center, which was designed and built by Mexican experts from all fields of specialization, and which will produce 3 million tons per year of basic raw materials for the manufacture of many products to meet the needs of individuals, including, among others: polyester fibers, pharmaceutical products, synthetic rubber, detergents, paints and cosmetics.

"La Cangrejera" is Mexican Petroleum's answer to an urgent need related to national economic development: to achieve self-sufficiency in the production of petrochemicals, as demanded by the growth of manufacturing throughout the entire republic.

"La Cangrejera" will also constitute a new center for industrial development, and hence for the generation of jobs and of wealth for the country, together with three other large petrochemical complexes: "Pajaritos," which is already in production; "Morelos," which is under construction; and the one in the industrial port of Laguna de Ostion, in the design stage, also located in the state of Veracruz.

"La Cangrejera" is also a result of the great effort maintained by Mexican Petroleum over 5 years of intensive activity. During its first phase, it will first supply the national market, and later the international one, with 11 basic raw materials, namely: ethylene oxide, acetaldehyde, low density polyethylene, benzene, toluene, orthoxylene, paraxylene, heavy aromatics, xylene mixtures, ethylbenzene and cumene. It will also produce propane, butane, butylene, pentane, hexane and naphtha.

The 11 petrochemical products are used by the national industry for the manufacture of countless consumer items.

The new complex is located on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 8 kilometers east of the town of Coatzacoalcos, on the highway leading to Villahermosa. It lies 5 kilometers from the port of Pajaritos, and 4 from the industrial center of the same name. It is also near the "Morelos" complex, situated in the municipality of Allende, and

the complex in Laguna del Ostion. It covers an area of 270 hectares on the property known as "La Cangrejera," the total area of which is 1,331 hectares.

The production will be accrued from petroleum and liquids from gas. "La Cangrejera" will receive 200,000 barrels per day of crude for its industrial operations.

The complex is divided into three areas: The first one, for storage, has six vertical tanks for crude oil, each having a capacity of 200,000 barrels; five more, with a 100,000 barrel capacity, for primary gasoline fuel oil and aromatic products; and a group of spherical tanks for gas and high pressure products; as well as 50 tanks with a lesser capacity for intermediate and finished products. It also has a gas regulation and gage station, and the gas will be shipped to "La Cangrejera" from the Cactus area, in Chiapas.

In another area, there will be 20 plants in operation, 19 petrochemical ones and one for chemical processing, to obtain oxygen and nitrogen from the air.

The third section is the one for auxiliary services. "La Cangrejera" will be self-sufficient in that area. It has a treatment system and systems for supplying water to the entire complex, including the fireproofing. In addition, it has nine boilers for generating steam. The high pressure boilers will feed four large turbogenerators of electricity.

Moreover, various exterior projects have been constructed, including a reservoir with a capacity of 40 million cubic meters and a waterworks.

Finally, there are the buildings for the administrative functions that are required, as well as a medical clinic for the personnel.

"La Cangrejera" also has facilities for protecting the environment. Using totally Mexican technology, a waste treatment plant was developed in which all the liquid waste will be chemically processed before being discharged into the sewer pipes. There is also an area of burners for the gases which can no longer be used.

#### PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 31-A. Crude stabilizer plant, for 200,000 barrels per day.
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## ISAAC ROJAS REFUTES CHILEAN OFFICIAL'S STATEMENTS ON BEAGLE

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 6 May 81 p 9

[Article by Isaac Francisco Rojas: "The Oceanic Separation and Argentine Atlantic Continuity"]

[Text] Some time ago, the Chilean undersecretary of foreign relations declared that "the two-ocean principle is nonexistent," referring undoubtedly to the "principle or rule of an oceanic separation between the Pacific and the Atlantic in the southern zone, from the Beagle Channel southward." He added that, "for a principle to be valid, it must be proven and there must be grounds for it." Previously, high-ranking officials from the neighboring country had said that the matter of the oceanic separation was an "old story, that should not be taken seriously."

The tyranny of space prevents us from developing at length the refutation required by such claims, which we shall not even judge; but we shall attempt to summarize it.

#### Some Geographical Background

The chairman of the Argentine Association of Geographic Studies [SAEG], Prof Federico A. Daus, maintains: "The reiterated and always accepted determination of traditional geography demarcating the Atlantic Ocean from the Pacific at the meridian of the extreme southern tip of America is, without doubt, one of the soundest acquisitions of geographical knowledge. Generally speaking, it may be said that all authorities have been inclined toward this solution which, in itself, is clearcut and persuasive (O. Krümmel, 'Handbuch der Ozeanographie' [Manual of Oceanography], Stuttgart, 1904)." And he also declares: "The most modern researchers have not missed any opportunity to reopen the discussion exhausted by the previous generation on the controversial issue. Schott ('Geographie des Atlantischen Ozeans' [Geography of the Atlantic Ocean], Hamburg, 1912), G. Wuest ('Die Grenzender Ozeane und Ihre Nebenmeer' [The Border Oceans and Their Adjacent Seas], 1939) and Le Danois ('El Atlantico' [The Atlantic], Buenos Aires, 1940), agree with the fundamental aspects of the traditional criterion. Particularly valuable in this respect is the system for the division of the oceans in natural regions offered by the first-mentioned author and reprinted in this publication. It involves secondary divisions wherein no consideration is given the Southern Antilles Sea which, according to Le Danois, on the other hand, is an individualized sea dependent on the Atlantic (Figure 1). If the proposition being contested (the Chilean one) were accepted, and hence it was agreed that the Southern Antilles or Scotia Sea was dependent on the Pacific Ocean, the result would



be the formation of a geographical system of oceans with strange and really excessive contours (Bulletins of the SAEG, No 32 of 1956 and No 97 of 1978)."

Dr Olsacher, a geologist and member of the same institution, for his part, states: "And having thus demonstrated the subordination of the Arc of the Southern Antilles to the Atlantic dynamics which made its existence possible, one cannot doubt that the respective geological history firmly backs the concept (coinciding with the concept adhered to thus far) that what that sea contains (Southern Antilles or Scotia Sea) is an integral part of the Atlantic Ocean and not the Pacific Ocean, as the aforementioned outward appearance might indicate."

Dr Olsacher's statements (in the same Bulletins) are backed by the opinion of 34 universally prestigious scientists, such as Wegener, Molke, Stille, Franck, Schott Le Danois, Sgroso, Castellano, etc.

Moving on to our oceanographer, Capt (ret) Luis R. Capurro, we shall repeat with him: "During the 18th century, Fleurieu set the borders of the Atlantic as follows: In the north and south, this ocean is bordered by the polar circles separating it from the polar basins; the border with the Pacific is the Cape Horn meridian. In 1845, the London Geographical Society appointed a committee to establish the names and borders of the maritime areas. It adopted the name 'Atlantic' in the sense in which it had been used and defined by Varen in 1659. The results of the committee's judgment were not published until 1893, in the London Geographical Journal (Vol 1, p 535)." And Captain Capurro, very well backed by Fleurieu and the aforementioned committee, concludes by saying: "So the result is that the Cape Horn meridian remained the southwestern border of the Atlantic Ocean, and therefore has historical priority." Dr Domingo Sabate Lichtschein discusses this at length in his work "Argentine Problems of Territorial Sovereignty" (1976 and 1979), with an abundance of quotes from scientists (Richard Dana, Donald Macintyre, Krummel, M.L. Gregoire and the aforementioned London committee, among others). Our fellow countryman, Dr Raul Rey Balmaceda has also concerned himself with this question, as have Gen Osiris Villegas and Dr Camilo H. Rodriguez Berrutti.

I shall conclude this brief summary of authorized quotes with the following notion of the well-known French geographer, Camille Vallaux, who says: "As for the demarcation of the three great oceans in the Southern Hemisphere, where they are joined together at the 35th latitude at the southern tip of Africa, the 37th, at the tip of Australia and the 56th, at the tip of South America, Fleurieu had conventional lines adopted: the meridians of the Cape of Good Hope, Cape South Tasmania and Cape Horn (Figure 2)."

Conclusion: Geographical science states that the "principle of oceanic separation of the Atlantic and Pacific" exists, is in effect and has been demonstrated with more than sufficient grounds (Figure 3).

#### Some Historical Background

In the famous debate in Congress during August-September 1881, Dr Bernardo de Irigoyen declared: "With Patagonia excluded from the debate and the negotiation, we have had in mind, as a political intention, the maintenance of our jurisdiction over the Atlantic coasts, and we have attained it. Mr Chairman, they cover approximately

1,500 miles, and they are all under the exclusive jurisdiction of this republic, whose flag will be the only one that will fly as a symbol of territorial possession from Rio Negro to the Strait and Cape Horn (the principle of oceanic separation). In using this phrase (a method of arbitration), I referred to the possible loss of a major portion of Patagonia, and I did not wish to conceal the possibility that the national jurisdiction might be interrupted on some section of the coast extending as far as Cape Horn (principle of Argentine Atlantic continuity)."

This was the view of the Argentine negotiators, and these are the inexorable grounds for both principles (oceanic separation and Atlantic continuity).

Let us now observe some Chilean notions. The geographical expert, Chilean engineer Eduardo de la Barra states, in his book entitled "The Problem of the Andes" (1895): "Where there is an attempt to discern a de facto compensation is in the fact that Chile has consented to a change in the Tierra del Fuego border...and the Argentine Republic is in exclusive possession of the Atlantic coast, giving up, on the other hand, the coast that it might have had in the Pacific approaching the 52d parallel (a hypothetical concession that would not be fitting), so that Chile would retain exclusive possession of those coasts. That is a logical result of the principle established between the two nations, whereby Tierra del Fuego and the adjacent islands were divided: Chile in the Pacific, and the Argentine Republic in the Atlantic." And Mr Ricardo Paz, in his book "The Unresolved Conflict" (Vol II, the Beagle and Cape Horn), remarks: "It is difficult for us to leave unfinished the endless list of Chilean quotations regarding the true concept of the Atlantic...but it is even more difficult to find the scantiness of our account to the court of arbitration on the same issue...as compared with the Chilean arguments regarding the expression 'other islands on the Atlantic' (Article 3, Treaty of 1881), for which reason they were assigned to Argentina." Why was the Chilean engineer, de la Barra, not quoted?

But there is more. On page 159 of de la Barra's book we read: "However, the spirit which inspired the pact of 1881 was different. When the foreign ministers established that artificial boundary of Tierra del Fuego, they did so for the purpose of making the Atlantic coasts exclusively Argentine, and those of the Pacific, Chilean. But this principle lacked legal force (Treaty of 1881) so long as it did not declare this explicitly. It was not included in the treaty, although it was in the minds of the negotiators. It may be said that it was in the minds of the negotiators; it may be said that it was in the spirit of the Chilean-Argentine policy.... At the same time, the doctrine of both foreign ministers was affirmed: 'Chile in the Pacific, and Argentina in the Atlantic,' and as a result the difficulty of the Tierra del Fuego borderline was surmounted, adapting to that principle which had been acknowledged previously but which was not expressed in a public document." As we know, the legal, restrictive recognition of that principle was engraved forever in the Additional Explanatory Protocol of 1898, which evoked the following comment by de la Barra in his work that has already been mentioned: "We have previously observed the scope and significance of this principle, which is the only essential innovation in the pact of 1893 with respect to that of 1881." He then concludes by saying: "Chile seeks nothing in the Atlantic nor east of the Andes, for it is heedful of faithful compliance with the treaties. And if the Argentine Republic were to harbor some capricious notions in the west, it would fail in them. It would not be aided by the full force of the law, which is clear in the law and evident in fact." We also wonder why the Argentine delegation to the Geneva court of arbitration did not assert this evidence, as well as that of so many Chileans who have steadfastly supported the principle of oceanic separation? With the passage of the years it

would be demonstrated, and we are in the situation whereby the one "harboring capricious notions" is Chile, and not Argentina; and toward the east, of course, toward the Atlantic, pursuing its old dreams of becoming a two-ocean country.

In the book by our fellow countryman, Antonio Bermejo, entitled "The Chilean Issue and Arbitration" (1879), we read: "...handwritten by Dr Ibanez (Chile's minister plenipotentiary in London), in a note of 2 May 1872, the latter states: 'It has not been the intention of the Chilean Government to include in it the entire eastern coast of Patagonia, nor to oppose the jurisdiction exercised by the Argentine Republic over the waters of the Atlantic Sea.'"

#### Some Legal Background: the Treaties

According to the Treaty of 1881, Argentina retained its right to coasts on the Pacific (Gulf of Ultima Esperanza, Bay of Pascua, now Almirante Montt). Let us give the floor to Dr Sabate Lichtschein: "In view of this situation, the government of Chile requested the amendment of the Treaty of 1881 to prevent our territory from extending over that ocean (the Pacific). And, in order to achieve this amendment, the Argentine-Chilean Treaty of 1 May 1893 was concluded, and called an 'additional explanatory protocol to the Border Treaty of 1881.' Article 2 thereof stipulated that, 'If in the peninsular section of the south, approaching the 52d parallel, there should appear the mountain range enclosed in the Pacific canals that exist there, the experts will order the study of the terrain in order to set the dividing line that will leave the coasts of those channels to Chile.'"

Despite Argentina's gracious compliance and excessive generosity, for which reason, and none other, our country voluntarily, solemnly and contractually gave up its privileged status as a two-ocean nation conferred upon it by the "uti possidetis juris of 1810," the origins of which are clearly expressed in the agreements concluded in 1534 between the Spanish monarch and the first founder of Buenos Aires, Pedro de Mendoza, which were never amended, but rather confirmed, the negotiators agreed to a safeguard clause which is inscribed in the first part of Article 2 that has been cited, as a result of which our Pacific coast was taken away without obtaining any compensation, because the change in the notation of the meridian which began at Cape Espiritu Santo on Isla Grande was based only on a cartographic correction and not on a Chilean concession of an Atlantic coast in San Sebastian Bay. It is difficult (for us) to admit this, but we allowed ourselves to be involved in the clever, unfair, Chilean maneuver to deprive us of our clear right in the Pacific, in exchange for a pretended concession to Argentina in the Atlantic.

Although this clause is by now quite well known, but was not used forcefully by the Argentine delegation at Geneva and, apparently, not with His Holiness by the current negotiators either, we shall repeat it, because it is precisely the legal recognition of the "principle of oceanic separation" which has been stressed with both perspicacity and faithfulness to the commitments that have been assumed, by the Chilean engineer, Eduardo de la Barra, and by many prominent Chilean and Argentine personages of that time: "The sovereignty of each state over the respective coast is absolute, so that Chile cannot seek any point toward the Atlantic, nor can Argentina seek any toward the Pacific."

And, finally, we come to the Explanatory Act of the pacts on arbitration and limitation of arms, of 1902, Article 7 of which stipulates that, "Both governments are to fulfill the necessary tasks, one for the natural defense and permanent destiny of the Argentine Republic in the Atlantic and the River Plate, and the other for the natural defense and permanent destiny of the Republic of Chile in the Pacific."

#### Two Fundamental Elements.

The "principle of oceanic separation must be fulfilled correctly and faithfully," just as Argentine Atlantic continuity must be kept intact.

The Cape Horn meridian, and no other line, indicates the southern border which makes this principle real and effective. Just as the Point Dungeness-Cape Espiritu Santo line supplements it (Figure 4); because both this line and that meridian, from the Beagle Channel southward, prevent Chile from having coasts or from claiming rights to maritime territories in the Atlantic. If another dividing line were drawn, if in the future agreements mention were made of upholding these principles, but different dividing lines were drawn which did not coincide with those indicated, there would be a falsification of the truth, a betrayal of history, a belying of geography and a lack of the faithfulness sworn upon signing the treaties. The Chilean geophagic maneuver would have triumphed, and our "pacifists" would breathe easily, without realizing that they were adhering, perhaps involuntarily, to another Chilean pressure, at the cost of Argentine territory.


However, we hope that this will not happen. The Argentine territorial conscience has now been aroused, and is being rapidly asserted in the intellect of its people. The government of the Armed Forces has made correct and consistent statements. Chile must be respected without aggressiveness nor boasting, but with the force and steadfastness that befit our traditions and our national pride.

We do not expect any other policy that would not be in keeping with the statement contained in the message from the former foreign minister, Vice Adm Oscar Antonio Montes, on 27 January 1978, accompanying the Declaration of Nullity of the Decision of the Arbitrator of Queen Elizabeth II:

"For the reasons given, the higher government of the nation reaffirms the Argentine Republic's sovereignty over the insular territories, maritime areas, continental shelf and ocean floors which unquestionably belong to it, because they are located in the Atlantic Ocean east of the Cape Horn meridian, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Treaties of 1881, 1893 and 1902. It likewise expresses its decision to adopt all the necessary measures for the defense of its rights in the zone as far as Cape Horn."

The Chilean undersecretary of foreign relations is making a serious mistake in denying the force of the principle of oceanic separation. His own fellow countrymen have established and praised it, along with the Argentine negotiators of those treaties. Nor can we agree that it is an "old story." If that concept had become entrenched, international law would have disappeared. And if Chile were the promoter of this new concept, we would have to consider it aligned with the nations in history which have been marked by their adherence to the so-called "bad faith." We have seen too many examples, and others which have, not long ago, triggered worldwide catastrophes, not to feel alarmed by the new "juridical" winds that are blowing on the other side of the mountains.






(1) Figure 1: 1) Roca Cormoranes, 2) Roca Negras, 3) Banco Barwood

Key:


1. Figure 1: 1) Cormoran Reef; 2) Negras Reefs; 3) Barwood Bank
2. Sketch
3. Pacific Ocean
4. Atlantic Ocean
5. Southern Antilles Arc
6. Argentine Antarctic



(1) **Figura 2: 1) Limite Pacifico-Atlántico; 2) Limite Atlántico-Indico; 3) Limite Indico-Pacifico**  
 (De los Boletines Nº 3 y 97 de la Sociedad Argentina de Estudios Geográficos). Los límites  
 entre los océanos (líneas gruesas) y las regiones naturales en los mismos, numerados según

Key:

1. **Figure 2: 1) Pacific-Atlantic Border; 2) Atlantic-Indian Border; 3) Indian-Pacific Border** (from Bulletins Nos 3 and 97 of the Argentina Association of Geographic Studies). The borders between the oceans (heavy lines) and the natural regions therein are numbered according to Schott.



(1) Figura 3: Línea divisoria entre la océanos Atlántico y Pacífico (Meridiano del Cabo de Hornos)

Key:

1. Figure 3: Dividing line between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Cape Horn meridian)
2. Argentine sovereignty
3. Pacific Ocean
4. Atlantic Ocean
5. Beagle Channel
6. Le Maire Strait



(1) Figura 4: La parte rayada representa el estrecho de Magallanes, desde cabo Virgenes hasta C. Espiritu Santo, neutralizado a perpetuidad por el Tratado de 1881. La parte grisada, el territorio argentino y la seccion argentina del estrecho de Magallanes

Key:

1. Figure 4: The striped section represents the Strait of Magellan from Cape Virgenes to Cape Espiritu Santo, neutralized in perpetuity by the Treaty of 1881. The gray section, Argentine territory and the Argentine section of the Strait of Magellan
2. Strait of Magellan
3. Argentine Section
4. Atlantic Ocean



## PAPER COMMENTS ON IMBALANCED TRADE RELATIONS WITH USSR

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 23 May 81 p 6

[Editorial: "Our Trade With the USSR"]

[Text] In recent years, our exchanges with the USSR have experienced a sizable growth and, especially since 1980, an explosive development, which has turned the Soviet market into the leading foreign customer for Argentine products.

The remarkable volume attained by Argentine sales to that destination cannot fail to be regarded as a positive fact, in more than one sense; but, nevertheless, it brings up disturbing possibilities that should be considered in a timely manner. We say in more than one sense because there is no question that the steady flow of exports to the USSR afforded an income in foreign exchange which would otherwise have been impossible to accrue under the same circumstances; because, in this way, it was possible to avoid a more serious decline in the income return of the agricultural sector; and, from a different standpoint, because it enabled Argentina to display a laudable independence of judgment toward the grain embargo, a unilateral measure adopted by one superpower against another, which does not fit into the traditional principles of our country's foreign policy, such as the one that does not make commercial transactions an instrument for political pressure.

In 1977, our country had exported to the Soviet Union, which already ranked among the leading purchasers of Argentine products, a total of \$210 million. That amount was doubled in 1979, when sales totaled \$415 million; but, last year, the multiplication of shipments brought the total volume to nearly \$1.8 billion, a figure which is to be repeated (and might even be exceeded) during the course of 1981. Commercially speaking, these results are unquestionably excellent, and the agreements signed between the two countries for supplies of grain and meat to the USSR promise to continue through the next few years.

But, as we noted, this critical importance that the Soviet market has assumed to Argentine foreign trade poses its own problems. We must not overlook the fact that, in 1980 and thus far in this fiscal year, the sales with that destination supplied one out of every five dollars entering our country as a result of transactions involving goods, and that something like 60 percent of the shipments of grain, including 90 percent of the forage grains exported, went to Soviet ports.

The fact is that excessive dependence on a single major purchaser naturally puts the seller in a rather uncomfortable position. We are not considering the

possibility that, on the basis of this situation, the USSR might (now or at another point in history) exert political pressure on our government's decisions; because Argentina has managed to give sufficient proof of its independence, for example, with that very position toward the grain embargo. We are, rather, considering the fact that those relations might be curtailed more or less suddenly, owing to the turbulent circumstances of international politics, and even regardless of the best intentions that the parties might have to preserve the flow of trade. Our country has already had an historical experience with the significance of excessive concentration of its sales of agricultural and livestock products on a single market, resulting from the relationship that, until a few half-decades ago, linked us commercially with the United Kingdom, a trading partner with which we have always, obviously, had far stronger and more stable bonds of friendship and diplomatic ties than with the Soviet Union.

Moreover, it is good policy to consider international trade as a two-way street. Although the exchange is a multilateral activity wherein the deficits with some countries and the surpluses with others are compensated for, differences that are too extensive and persistent are usually irritating factors. And, in comparison with the increase in Argentine exports, our country's purchases in the Soviet Union have remained more or less stagnant, with an annual maximum of \$30 million attained in 1979 which, at the current rate, would be equivalent to less than a week of Argentine exports. This imbalance also lends some weakness to the trade relations. The Soviet vice minister of foreign trade, in a visit to our country, recently remarked that a possible increase in his country's purchases in Argentina, in addition to the current agreements in effect, must be accompanied by a certain amount of reciprocity. However, one does not note in our business firms any great interest in purchasing Soviet goods, the incorporation of which would confront them, at least, with new difficult situations involving adaptation.

In short, it may be said that the recent development of our trade with the USSR is a positive sign in the economic picture, but it is not feasible, nor wise, to base the medium term forecasts on that fact, lending it a deciding role in the preparation of operational policies. There is no reason to discourage this exchange, but it must be realized that, like any imbalance, it is a distorting factor, a source of potential problems, for which we must devise in advance effective remedies that must include the diversification of exportable production, an increase in our competitive capacity and the search for new markets.

## 'LA NACION' QUESTIONS BAN ON HOLOCAUST FILM

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 22 May 81 p 8

[Editorial: "To Learn From the Past"]

[Text] As the public is well aware, the documentary series "Holocaust" was filmed to be shown on television, and had major repercussions in the Western countries in which it was exhibited. In a few nations, including ours, that series has not been televised. It would be interesting to learn the reasons for which the pertinent authorities decided that the Argentine public would not have a direct view of the horrors to which totalitarianism can lead.

The reader will doubtless recall that the number of victims of World War II totaled the astronomical figure of 23 million souls. A significant part of that number relates to the notorious concentration camps in which people from all the nations, persuasions and creeds opposed to Hitler's madness were crowded. And if a quarter of the aforementioned number related to the descendants of the builders of the temple of Jerusalem, this is not fortuitous: the Judeo-Christian ethic had to be eradicated in order to facilitate the entrenchment of those who desecrated the image of proudly walking the "goose-step."

In the concentration camps, the Gestapo officiated at the altar of Lucifer, and Christians and Jews often were joined fraternally at the time of the final end. The greatest genocide in history was perpetrated unhesitatingly by the dehumanized hordes of absolutism, subject to the dictates of the Fuehrer and to the requirements of "Realpolitik."

The Nazis lost the war but, at a time when "nostalgia" is in style, their aftermath is evident in the international resurgence of fascism, which in chameleon fashion is ready to pass through the entire chromatic spectrum, provided it maintains, or attains power. The international terrorists are now trained in the "socialist" countries, to enthrone another Reich, hypocritically concealed by the banners that proclaim the establishment of a "better world."

The ethical standards of our civilization, from those issued at Mount Sinai to the Sermon on the Mount, have not yet been overcome by the ideological executioners. And in view of the theological impossibility of separating the components of Judeo-Christianity, it is from every standpoint incomprehensible that the "Holocaust" series should not reach the television screens of Argentine households.

We might add that, recently, in the chapel of the Salvador School, there was celebrated "a Mass for the perpetual repose of the soul of Hitler," the person chiefly responsible for the greatest attack on the essence of Christianity. This poses another question without any possible explanation.

The consciences of free people must be alerted, because to claim as a mitigating circumstance that this involves only insignificant small groups is of no avail. At the root of the "Holocaust" we find in Munich a few happy, excited beer drinkers.

2909

CSO: 3010/1378

## 'LA PRENSA' CONSIDERS MASS FOR HITLER IMPROPER

Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 19 May 81 p 8

[Editorial: "A Mass for Hitler"]

[Text] A few days ago, in the chapel of a religious school in this capital, a Mass was celebrated for the repose of the soul of Adolf Hitler, arranged by a Nazi racist organization the name of which is irrelevant. Upon the announcement of the religious service, many may have wondered whether Hitler was actually a Catholic, and whether, regardless of that denominational status, he was worthy of the compassionate ceremony that had been organized in his memory. On the other hand, others, like ourselves, regard that ceremony as improper.

On the occasion of the same or similar functions held in churches, at which tribute was given to those who, while living, in the view of posterity and history, did not merit such intercessory prayers and recognition, there have been opinions in favor of those demonstrations, which seldom failed to be related to the political affiliation or authoritarian ideology of their organizers.

A little over a century ago, a controversy arose in our country as to whether or not it was proper to celebrate a Mass in the church of San Ignacio in memory of Juan Manuel de Rozas, who had just died, on 14 March 1877, in Southampton. It was finally decided, at least for the practical purposes pursued at that time by the tyrant's followers, by a resolution from the Buenos Aires Province Department of Government, signed by Governor Carlos Casares and his collaborators, Vicente G. Quesada and Rufino Varela. In its whereas clauses, it stated: "Juan Manuel Rozas has been declared by law a 'convicted traitor' for the cruel tyranny that he exercised over the people during the entire period of his dictatorship, even violating the laws of nature, and for having betrayed in many instances the independence of his country, sacrificing its liberty and honor to his ambition. And whereas, finally, it is the obligation of governments to keep the sentiments of love for liberty and hatred for tyrants safe and unsullied, the Executive Branch resolves and decrees: Article 1. Any public demonstration on behalf of the memory of the tyrant Juan Manuel de Rozas, whatever its nature may be, is prohibited. Article 2. Consequently, there is a ban on the funeral for which invitations have been tendered, on Tuesday, at the church of San Ignacio, as a public demonstration."

Two days later, on 23 April 1877, the National Executive Branch, through a decree signed by President Avellaneda and Minister Adolfo Alsina, ordered that, having

learned of the death of Rozas, and in view of the fact "that the people of Buenos Aires have been invited by a number of citizens affiliated with all the political parties wherein public opinion is divided, to attend church for the perpetual repose of the souls of those who were sacrificed during the barbarous tyranny of Juan Manuel Rozas, the national flag will remain at half-mast on all public buildings tomorrow, 24 April 1877, and the free corps of the garrison are to go to the Plaza de la Victoria to pay the pertinent funeral honors."

The position of the Buenos Aires government in banning the religious service at the church of San Ignacio, and that of the national government in sponsoring, not a Mass for the tyrant, but rather one for the latter's victims, revealed an agreement backed by an unequivocal conduct resulting from the judgment deserved by tyrannical governments. That position and that agreement merit recollection, particularly when one considers the degree of adherence that the despot had among a certain clergy of the time, according to studies and information provided by Ramos Mejia, in his book entitled "Juan Manuel de Rozas and His Time."

2909

CSO: 3010/1378



## PANAMANIAN, CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS TRAFFIC REPORTED

## Report of Legislative Assembly

PA011625 Panama City LA PRENSA in Spanish 29 May 81 p 2A

[Part one of article: "Panama and Cuba in the Arms Traffic;" subtitled: "Report of the Legislative Assembly of Costa Rica"]

## [Text] Introduction

For some weeks LA PRENSA has been publishing numerous reports, many of them exclusives, about the arms traffic that began during the Nicaraguan Civil War and has continued as a result of the insurrection in El Salvador and the guerrillas in Colombia with the direct or indirect participation of the Panamanian Government. The Costa Rican Legislative Assembly established a special commission to investigate the beginning of this traffic during the struggle against the Somoza tyranny. Beginning today LA PRENSA will publish excerpts of the "Report on the Arms Traffic" that this commission issued a few days ago. These excerpts refer to the import of war materiel from Panama, the import of war materiel from Cuba, in which Panama also participated, and the type of war materiel involved and the procedures used in this traffic.

## Part One

## Import of War Materiel from Panama

On the basis of the inventory drawn up by the comptroller general of the republic on the arsenal of the state, which includes only the government's version of the origin of the armaments, the following materiel entered the country from Panama: 23 75-mm guns; 6 120-mm mortars; 17 82-mm mortars; 8 machineguns; 4 muzzles and 74 spare barrels for machineguns; 12 3.5-in rocket launchers; 10 bazookas; 8 mag machineguns and 669 7.62 FAL rifles.

These weapons are the only ones that the government of the republic says it received from the Panamanian Government. However, according to the statement of Mr Willia Azofeifa, senior official of public security at that time, other flights were made with other types of military supplies (boots, uniforms, tents, medicine, etc) from Colombia (document No 18, page 238).

Unlike the weapons from Venezuela, about which there are specific details in the files on the quantity, characteristics and serial number of each weapon, in the case of the weapons from Panama there is no documentary proof of their characteristics and of course there is no inventory or acknowledgement of receipt by the Costa Rican Government.

This commission has also received repeated testimony that at Llano Grande Airport in Guanacaste and Juan Santamaria Airport, war materiel from Panama was unloaded from Panamanian Air Force planes as well as private planes. So far the commission has been unable to determine the quantity, characteristics and final destination of those weapons despite the efforts the commission has made in this regard.

#### Import of War Materiel From Cuba

At the beginning of our investigation we had information that a large part of the war materiel that entered the country during the Nicaraguan conflict came from Cuba. This charge became one of the most controversial points of our investigation, essentially due to the repeated statements of officials and former officials of the Public Security Ministry to the effect that flights carrying weapons from Cuba had not taken place.

On 4 November 1980 the members of the commission met with Costa Rican President Rodrigo Carazo Odio and in reply to a question of whether he was aware that flights with weapons from Cuba had taken place, he said that he was not aware that those flights took place but that if he had considered it necessary for the defense of the country he would have authorized them. However, in a subsequent meeting with the president after the media published the document "Testimony of Five Citizens to all Costa Ricans," signed by pilots Julio Cesar Calderon Hernandez, Alfredo Sanchez Rodriguez, Hugo M. Vargas Garro, Carlos Solano Herrera and Julio Saavedra Reyes, on 24 March 1981 (page 993), Carazo admitted that the flights loaded with armaments came from Cuba and added that they were weapons facilitated by the Panamanian Government.

Regarding this point, the commission has proven effectively that at least 21 flights from that point of origin were made, that all of them carried war materiel (although some testimony indicates that there were more flights), that each flight carried an average of 31,000 pounds and that their destination was Llano Grande Airport or Juan Santamaria International Airport.

From the analysis of the file and based on the statements from the pilots as well as other people, this commission has grounds to believe that the U.S. Government as well as other governments of America had full knowledge of this traffic from Cuba, its destination and purpose.

The commission has been unable to determine the quantity and characteristics of this armament due to the complete lack of inventories and controls and the great number of contradictions in which both public officials and private citizens who participated in this operation have incurred.



The commission has proven that the war materiel from Cuba was distributed in variable proportions that the commission has been unable to determine so far between the Sandinist National Liberation Front and the government of the republic in such a way that part of it was destined for the El Pelon de La Altura Farm and another for the Santa Rosa Farm, among other places.

The commission also heard repeated charges that individuals of various nationalities, essentially Venezuelans, Panamanians and Cubans, actively participated in the management and operation of the activities that were carried out in the northern border zone and many places in the country to the extent that we were informed that those individuals issued instructions to officials of the Public Security Ministry to carry out those activities. It was also charged that on some occasions flights carrying large groups of foreigners came into the country without any apparent immigration control. According to the National Security Office, immigration control was its only function at Llano Grande Airport.

#### Commission Presents Report

PA011630 Panama City LA PRENSA in Spanish 31 May 81 p 2A

[Part two of article: "Panama and Cuba in the Arms Traffic;" subtitled: "Means of Acquisition, Quantity, Type and Destination of Imported War Materiel"]

[Text] The war materiel arriving from Panama and Venezuela, as affirmed by the government, was obtained as a loan, without there being any documented proof in the records for this affirmation, as previously has been indicated. The confirmation of the previous statement will be made when the government returns all of that materiel to its country of origin. This has been partially done as pertains to the Panamanian materiel.

It is important to point out that if those weapons were not received as a loan but as a contract of purchase and sale or as a donation, it would clearly violate provision 75 of Law No 6205 of 18 December 1978 which says:

"All purchases or acquisitions by the state, under any circumstances, of military equipment, must have the prior approval of the Legislative Assembly, except for small arms routinely used by our police force."

The criteria of the undersigned deputies is that, even if the arms were brought into the country as a loan, this would have violated the spirit of the above law, which mainly reflects the desire of the Legislative Assembly to keeping war materiel from entering the country without prior approval by the country's highest authorities.

At this point of the investigation, we must state that the commission does not yet clearly understand if in fact the arms, which according to the government entered the country via Panama, were really part of the armaments coming from Cuba. The reason for this is that, for instance, the pilots who signed the aforementioned document, admitted having transported the four barrel machineguns from Havana (Certificate No 51, folio 986) and the government is now returning them to the government of Panama from which it says they were directly received.

Assuming that the arms coming from Venezuela and Panama were loaned to our government, it is not possible to say that the weapons coming from Cuba were also loaned. Until now no reports have been received as to what conditions were tied to the arms that were provided and whether or not they were provided under a government, private or Sandinist National Liberation [FSLN] contract.

Therefore total ambiguity exists concerning this subject, and three alternatives can be presumed; 1) that part of the arms coming from Cuba had been directly requested by the government from the Cuban Government or through the government of Panama; 2) that part of these weapons were brought to the country directly by the FSLN through private individuals; and 3) that a combination of operations was undertaken, which, in the commission's opinion, is the most probable. It is clear, according to numerous testimonies, that such amounts of war materiel were distributed in different percentages, between the government and the FSLN at any rate, any one of the three mentioned alternatives represents a violation to the purpose of the aforementioned law.

One of the things that most worried the commission and that demanded the most time and effort, was the verification of the number of arms. In this respect, we still have not been able to determine, even approximately, the amount of war material that came into the country, due basically to the following circumstances: a) unbelievably, there was no type of control and no inventory was made of the arms coming from Cuba, which in this commission's opinion, represents a total lack of responsibility and precaution in the handling of such a delicate and dangerous matter as war materiel; and b) the impossibility of determining the number of planes which entered the country with war equipment coming from various countries, as well as the impossibility of determining the various types of aircraft used. It is important to point out that there was no kind of air control in this matter either, violating, consequently, basic aviation practices contained in our laws and regulations as well as elementary air safety rules.

With these explanations and despite the tremendous difficulties we have faced, the commission can affirm, based on the testimonies and statements received, that an estimated 1 million pounds of arms and ammunition entered the country, based on an estimated minimum of 30 flights with a capacity of 30,000 to 35,000 pounds of cargo on each.

For the above reasons, the commission has not been able to give an exact report on the kind of war materiel that entered the country, although it can be deduced from some testimonies and some inventories, as in the case of Venezuela, as well as from the kind of armament returned to Panama, that four barrel antiaircraft machineguns; spare barrels for four barrel machineguns; riot-control batons [bastones chinos]; M-14 automatic rifles; Belgium-made light (FAL) automatic rifles; bazookas; various caliber canon-mortars; 3.5 inch rocket launchers; and MAC machineguns entered the country as well as an enormous amount of ammunition for the various types of weapons previously detailed.

Regarding the destination of the weapons that entered the country, the commission has proven the following:

a. The war materiel from Venezuela was destined solely for the Public Security Ministry;

b. The war materiel from Panama to which the Public Security Ministry has referred also had the destination of the arsenals of the government of the republic.

c. The weapons from Cuba and part of those from Panama were distributed in variable percentages between the government of the republic and the FSLN.

.. [as published] Although there it does not have concrete evidence, the commission has heard charges that part of the weapons from Cuba and other countries were destined for groups or private individuals. In this regard, although the commission does not have authentic and documentary proof that confirms that this war materiel was destined for groups or private individuals, it believes that part of these weapons remain in the country but does not know their final destination.

This aspect is so important that we believe it is absolutely necessary that the commission clearly state that it has been unable to determine the amount of war materiel that entered the country.

#### Procedures and Individuals Responsible for the Operation

The commission believes that the previous statement is an unjustifiable excuse because at the time, an inventory of the weapons that were delivered to the government could have easily been made without any great effort. The commission also believes that an inventory of the arms destined for the Sandinist Front should have been made.

As we have repeated throughout the report, this is one of the most serious points since in view of the circumstances in which the events occurred, it is impossible to determine the quantity, types and destination of the weapons that were left in the hands of the government. As was previously stated, it can be assumed that part of these weapons were left in hands that so far we have been unable to identify.

The following officials oversaw the operation in transporting, unloading and distributing the materiel: V. de Azofeifa, senior official of the Public Security Ministry at that time, and Guillermo Marti Vargas and Capt Mario Falias Madrigal. The responsibility for the operation fell on senior official Azofeifa who told the commission that he received instructions directly from Minister Llorente.

The entire operation was expressly authorized by the president of the republic and Llorente Brindley, security minister at that time. The latter issued express instructions to his subordinates to the effect that no inventory or any type of control was necessary.

The commission believes that if those controls had existed, most of the problems that have been denounced and led to our investigation would not have arisen and the country's transparency would not have been disrupted.

EID URGED TO BOSCH-PENA GOMEZ PUBLIC CONTROVERSY

Santo Domingo LISTIN DIARIO in Spanish 16 Apr 81 p 12

[Text] Mr Evelio Hernandez, former constitutionalist commander, has called on former President Juan Bosch and Dr Jose Francisco Pena Gomez to end their public controversy which has been going on for several weeks.

Hernandez, in written statements sent from Santiago, termed the dispute between the head of the PLD [Dominican Liberation Party] and the secretary general of the Dominican Revolutionary Party "useless."

The complete text of the statement by Mr Evelio Hernandez follows:

In recent weeks the nation has been observing a sharp conflict between Prof Juan Bosch and Dr Jose Francisco Pena Gomez. Both parties have been ordered to appear in court on charges of alleged libel and insults.

For those of us who in the memorable month of April 1965 responded to the appeal of freedom for the Dominican people and took up arms to support the constitutional government defeated in September 1963, it has been quite disturbing to see the clash between two of the leading participants in those glorious events, since aside from the political and ideological differences dividing them, they have played a role of great value in the nation's political life.

In the name of the thousands of our dead who heroically gave their lives in the constitutionalist revolution of 24 April, we call on the head of the PLD and the secretary general of the PRD [Dominican Revolutionary Party] to stop this public dispute, which does not mean that they should abandon their different political points of view.

We also appeal to the constitutionalists of the PRD and of the PLD to act as mediators between their leaders in order to halt this useless confrontation, and we ask the deputy secretary general of the PLD, former commander Norge Botello, in honor of our martyrs, to help to bring about this truce for [this confrontation] is so damaging to the future of the Dominican revolutionary process.

I hereby state that through my good relations with the Cuban diplomatic representatives accredited in Chile, where I have been, I can state that neither Dr Jose Francisco Pena Gomez nor Prof Juan Bosch had any knowledge of the landing of Col Francisco Alberto Caamano Dero at Caracoles Beach.

7679

CSO: 3010/1267

UPA STATEMENT BLAMES RIGHT FOR POLICE VIOLENCE

Santo Domingo EL NACIONAL in Spanish 9 Apr 81 p 23

[Statement by the Political Committee of the Anti-Imperialist Patriotic Union; date not specified]

[Text] As the UPA [Anti-Imperialist Patriotic Union] has stated on a number of occasions, the present economic crisis of our nation is starting to generate its explosive social and political consequences, trailing in its wake a wave of tragic events, on which our organization wishes to state its position today.

1. The economic situation of our people, which has generated the social and political convulsions which we began to experience at the time of the hateful visit of the U.S. naval fleet, could not be more difficult.

The subjection of our economy to foreign interests and to the small oligarchic group which owns land and controls industry and commerce is sinking growing sectors of our population into abysmal poverty.

With the exception of the small foreign and national elite that is profiting from the nation's wealth with the regime's aid, and the top-level technocrats who accompany and support this elite, the rest of our population--the overwhelming majority of the Dominican people--are living lives of poverty, desperation, and helplessness, made constantly worse by the unbearable rise in the cost of living, the increase in unemployment, the lack of land, and the very low wages.

2. This situation is naturally giving rise to and swelling the ranks of a just protest movement which in recent months has led tens of thousands of Dominicans on strike, into protest movements, and into the struggle.

Among these strikes are: the CODAL [expansion unknown] workers strike, the teachers strike, the public works employees strike, the national lottery employees strike, and strikes of workers in



a number of factories: Textil Los Minas, Molinos Dominicanos, Pasaco, etc. There has also been a doctors' strike, and the constant land occupations which are occurring on a daily basis.

This movement is perfectly natural and just. But the government, instead of responding to the demands, is acting in an overbearing manner and is taking the dubious course of political repression and violations of democratic liberties.

This is the true economic, social, and political framework created by the latest excesses of the regimes' repressive forces, which now have a record of hundreds of arrests, assaults, and endless beatings, in addition to four assassinations.

3. This situation is being exploited by the Balaguer electoralists on the far right and their coup-supporting wing which, holding high positions of authority, is making use of the present situation to promote actions that will facilitate the deterioration of the present order of affairs. This strategy has as its essential goal the restoration of the power that was lost, either with or without an election in 1982.

This situation is in turn being manipulated by those who support the reelection and continuation by any means of the government of Antonio Guzman. For some time now these elements have been talking of a state of emergency which may require the elimination of the legislative authority and the extension of the presidential mandate.

All of the far right, whether Guzmanist or Balaguerist, electoralist or nonelectoralist, whether inside or outside the government, every gang with its own particular purposes, is interested in continuing the deterioration of the precarious climate now prevailing in our nation.

This explains the cases of police brutality.

All of these designs are part of the new orientation of imperialism, which favors solutions calling for the establishment of "hardline" governments all over Latin America.

As we can see, we are witnessing a highly complex moment in our nation's political life. To cope with this we must have a proper understanding, so that we can draw from this situation the best advantages in terms of the development of the revolutionary movement.

4. For all of these reasons, the Patriotic Union hereby states:

- a. That the government of Antonio Guzman is primarily responsible for the events which have jolted the conscience of our citizens.
- b. That another factor which has led to the painful events of recent days is the presence within the regime's forces of repression of ultraright elements interested in creating a climate of confusion and instability to facilitate their return to absolute control.
- c. That the UPA reaffirms its support for the just struggle being fought by large sectors of the nation's working and professional classes, and we hereby alert the nation to the anarchic ingredients which the rightists and re-electionists want to introduce in order to make their plans become a reality.
- d. We forcefully condemn the assassins of the journalist and anti-imperialist worker, Marcelino Vega; of the students Angela Guzman and Felix Antonio Villar Sanchez; and of the newspaper vendor, Jesus Ciprian Valdez, and all the assaults and arrests made by the national police force.
- e. The UPA joins in the widespread demand for an exhaustive investigation of these painful events, and we demand that the guilty persons be brought to justice.
- f. We ask that the Senate issue a summons to the present chief of the national police, Gen Dr Virgilio Payan Rojas, and his immediate superior, the present secretary of state of the interior and police, Dr Rosa Julia de la Cruz.
- g. We also demand the immediate cessation of the situation of repression against our people, and the full enforcement of political rights.

In closing, we hereby alert our members and the people of the antidemocratic plans of the government, of the far right, and of the re-electionist forces, and we call on the people to continue the struggle, without conservatism but also without any anarchic practices which could justify new repressive onslaughts that would only further the dark designs we have here denounced.

The men and women of the UPA must follow strictly the guidelines of their organization!



PAPER DISCUSSES RELATIONS, SUPPORT FOR VENEZUELA

Santo Domingo EL NACIONAL in Spanish 21 Apr 81 p 8

[Editorial: "Venezuela's Foreign Policy in the Caribbean"]

[Text] The triumph of the Sandinist forces in Nicaragua, which defeated the last of the petty tyrants from the Somoza family, and the convulsions now shaking the very foundations of Salvadoran society, 20 years after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, show the strategic importance that the always historic Caribbean basin has once again acquired.

All the peoples who live on the borders of this "mare nostrum" of the Americas are on edge, alert, and somewhat nervous, since there are more than just a few people who think that the domino theory began with Nicaragua, with the second move taking place in San Salvador, and that the way is now clear for a move of the dominos to the Panama Canal.

It is not only the United States that does not want to be encircled and surrounded by regimes marked with the communist expansionist seal; there are other countries, such as ours, Costa Rica, and Venezuela, which feel the same.

It was precisely to make its position clear, leaving no room for doubts or uncertainties about the Caribbean policy of Venezuela, that President Luis Herrera Campins recently described this policy in very careful public statements.

Above all, President Herrera Campins supports the formation of an overall Latin American foreign policy, one "which can guarantee a homogenous presence in the region."

A person does not have to be particularly sharp-eyed to read between the lines and see a subtle reproach to some of our politicians who

want to acquire prestige as liberals and revolutionaries by courting well known Marxists and proclaiming themselves leftists, with doctrinal manifestations which betray their "dilettante" aspect, thereby imitating the sorcerer's apprentice who could unleash forces but not control them afterwards.

In reality we should not seek a quarrel with Cuba or with any country that has chosen to live under socialism of the Leninist type. That is their business: as our secretary of state for foreign relations, Manuel Enrique Tavares, said, we have no reason not to maintain relations, if those relations are in our interests, provided that they do not try to impose on us, by smuggling it in, a revolution like the one under which they are living or suffering.

We salute with pleasure and we support the statements made by Herrera Campins that Venezuela's foreign policy is oriented "toward support for the processes of institutionalizing freedom and democracy."

We too, as we have already said, believe that revolutions cannot be transplanted, and that those who want to repeat the Sierra Maestra revolution or who want to copy the Nicaraguan insurrection are making a mistake.

Referring to the problem that has been created for all of us in El Salvador, the Christian Democratic president of Venezuela said "that the moral, political, and economic support of Venezuela is intended fundamentally to aid those who want a stop, once and for all, to the fratricidal violence, to the terrorisms from the left and from the right that are devastating El Salvador."

Generally speaking, on this issue we do not believe that Venezuela has been truly generous in its economic aid to the Caribbean peoples who do not produce petroleum; such aid could spare the Caribbean peoples anxiety and political and social tensions.

To free us from the imponderable weight of hydrocarbons, the accord drawn up between Mexico and Venezuela in San Jose, Costa Rica, is not enough. Nor is it enough that 30 percent of what we buy will be credited to our long-term account so that it can be reinvested in the search for petroleum or in other productive areas.

The Caracas government has not relieved us of the burden of having to invest, year after year, \$550 million to buy this "black gold."

In economic terms, the government of Carlos Andres Perez was much more liberal and magnanimous with our nation than the government of Luis Herrera Campins is now.

In any event, the Caribbean policy outlined by the Venezuelan president removes from the Venezuelan government the stigma of an attempt to use its dispute with Mexico to become the leader of Latin America.

## GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN, PARTY LEADERS VIEW OPPOSITION

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 27 Apr 81 pp A-1, A-2

[Text] The government, through the minister of labor, said that it has suffered no political damage nor has it lost any popular support despite the fact that, as it said, the people are being stirred up to oppose the government's decisions and, by extension, to oppose the constitutional regime itself.

He also said that for the good of the nation, the Chamber of Representatives must support the work of the executive branch, as obstruction and paralysis are definitely destabilizing factors. "This is not so of constructive and rational opposition, which is highly useful for the consolidation of the democratic system."

Opposition and cooperation, as decisive factors in the new balance of political forces that is appearing in the nation, was the issue analyzed yesterday evening on "Alternative," a program broadcast on Sundays on channel 8.

The minister of labor, Aquiles Rigail, who took part in the program representing the pro-government movement, People, Change and Democracy, said that the government needs the opposition in order to learn of its mistakes and correct them, so it is essential for the opposition to act responsibly, using serious arguments, and allowing the government to defend its actions. Therefore, he added, the government does not fear the opposition; it welcomes opposition, as an assertion of freedom.

He further said that the government still has kept intact its popular support, as shown by the acclamations received by the president every day from all corners of the country. He attributed this to the government's energetic program which, insofar as possible, is expressed by projects for the public welfare. He added that the government is acting responsibly, by adopting whatever steps are necessary, despite their potential political cost.

The minister of labor later mentioned the need for the government to be given time, without expecting miracles of it, as programs which will truly benefit the general welfare are long-term projects.

As for the executive-legislative relationship, the attorney Rigall pointed out the need for the Chamber of Representatives to avoid obstructionism and, even beyond that, to support the government's program to benefit the nation, thus forestalling any destabilizing maneuvers.

The deputy Xavier Ledesma explained, at the beginning of his remarks, that the decision of the Democratic Left is to oppose both the government and the right, and to avoid any rapprochement. "We want to inaugurate a different opposition, without obstruction, one which will be objective and serious and which will in this way help to consolidate democracy and to carry out our great national objectives."

He said that the government of President Roldos has taken some antipopular positions such as the latest economic measures. Also, in terms of morality, the nation is witnessing a very strange spectacle. He mentioned a number of cases of administrative and business irregularities, all of which, he pointed out, have not been punished at all.

Ledesma stressed the need for the government to correct its mistakes and, above all, to fulfill its promises and proposals. He said that it is this lack of compliance which determined the opposition of the Democratic Left, a position that in no way implies any rapprochement with the rightist parties, such as the Conservative Party or the Social Christian Party, nor with those that have devoted their efforts to obstructionism, such as the CFP [Concentration of Popular Forces]. He announced that the Democratic Left might eventually agree to support the government in those initiatives which it considers positive, since his party's opposition is not based on feelings, but on ideology.

Dr Julio Moreno Espinosa then confirmed that the Liberal Party has held talks with the government, but he stated that these talks do not mean collaboration, nor do they necessarily form a prelude to a new pro-government position. He said that Liberalism has invariably kept an independent and critical position, which in his opinion should not be changed.

He also said that he believes there are no agreements or points of convergence between the government and Liberalism. "The nation is now totally frustrated with the government, and Liberalism cannot and should not be involved in that," he added.

He commented that the fact that the government has not corrected its mistakes or paid any attention to all the questions that have been asked of it certainly deserves criticism. For that reason, "opposition, including constructive opposition, has so far been useless, since the government has persisted in its mistakes," he said.

In closing he said that if the government continues to ignore the democratic, reasoned, and constructive opposition, it will have to be replaced by constitutional means, by mechanisms established in Ecuadorean law.

The CFP legislator, Julio Ayala Serra, said, first of all, that the government's argument accusing the opposition of destabilizing democracy is absurd and unacceptable. "The CFP is actually the party most interested in having the government finish its term in office, since our party has always been the primary victim of any dictatorship."

He maintained that the CFP's opposition has been limited to being unyielding in pointing out errors, since, as he said, his party's objective is to have the government carry out its proposals, which are the ones formulated by the CFP during the election campaign. He added that none of the CFP proposals included price increases, the obtaining of bureaucratic jobs, the institutionalization of administrative immorality, and finally, the actions that have been typical of the government's work.

He then said that the CFP is now, more than even before, the spokesman of popular discontent; for the people feel frustrated and deceived.

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CSO: 3010/1311



## ROLDOS UPHOLDS DEMOCRACY, DENIES PRESSURE ON FOREIGN POLICY

Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 3 May 81 pp A-1, A-2

[Text] The president of the republic, Jaime Roldos Aguilera, categorically denied that Ecuador's foreign policy is subject to foreign pressures. He also reiterated that this country has a democratic and sovereign government.

The chief executive, speaking at a press conference last week, said that as Ecuador has a democratic government and nation, it does not accept or tolerate pressures. There is no international pressure of any sort, he said, on the free and sovereign government of Ecuador.

He commented that this nation is based on principles both in its national and its international policy.

He explained that the talks he held during his latest trip were of a political nature. These talks were with the secretary general of the OAS, Alejandro Orfila, the assistant secretary for Latin American affairs of the United States, Thomas Enders, and the presidents of Panama, Aristides Royo, and of Venezuela, Luis Herrera Campins.

The chief of state reported that when there are talks between political leaders the issues naturally are political, as these talks were.

He reported that the conversation with the U.S. representative was on the bilateral policy of the United States and Ecuador. There was discussion of Latin American policy and on his opinion of what policy toward that region should be.

He observed that Latin America has to be considered when speaking of good relations between our people and the United States. He felt that relations between Ecuador and the United States are good.

The president said that Latin America has primarily social problems, and the social problems of Latin America are not problems that can be resolved with police measures. Social problems, he said, are resolved by means of social measures. That, he said, is the essence of our thesis.

He added that he believes that Latin America is not and has not been oriented toward communism; nor is it oriented toward a fascist sort of rightwing totalitarianism. Neither of these two extremes are suitable for Latin America; they do not reflect the position of our peoples nor can they solve our problems.

He noted that we are living in a period in which the extremes are trying to radicalize our peoples and return to a time of neo-McCarthyism or to take us back to the decade of the 1960's; this position is really remote from the true humanist position of our continent.

These opinions, said President Roldos, were discussed during the talks with the secretary general of the OAS, Alejandro Orfila, since our position in the regional organization is to attempt to strengthen its efficacy.

In his talks with President Royo of Panama held in the city of Miami, and with the Venezuelan President Herrera in Caracas, the issue of Latin America and the strengthening of our organizations were the topics under discussion.

I think, said the president, that one of the major challenges that we have facing us in democracy is to try to strengthen ourselves. He remarked that the enemy of democracy, rather than being outside, actually lies within ourselves, if we are unable to act and to prove that democratic models are effective models. For some people try to emphasize the inefficiency of democracy, compared with the efficiency of totalitarian systems, of dictatorships. That is a truly negative position.

To a question about the danger to Ecuador's democratic stability caused by the presence of the Reagan administration in the United States, the Ecuadorean chief of state answered that an administration has to be judged by deeds.

He said that President Reagan was elected by the will of the U.S. people. And he added, in our constitutional system, the first thing we want in order to not be in dictatorships, is for governments to be a product of representative democracy. That is a positive factor.

He added that the important thing is what the Reagan administration will do in relation to Latin America.

The president, repeating his thoughts about international policy, said: we want to be friends with all peoples, but being friends means being respected. Friendship does not mean dependency, and respect does not mean being dominated in any way. This is Ecuador's policy, and it has been clearly defined.

He said that there is a tendency in Latin America--on the part of the far right--to label any movement that calls for just social demands extremist, just as the leftist extremists want to destabilize nations by any anarchic measures, in order to create serious disruptions.

We, said the president, are defending democratic stability. I also think that the foreign policy of the United States must be judged not only unilaterally in terms of that policy, but also in relation to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The conflict of the two superpowers with the rest of the world, and especially with developing peoples, creates a harsh and difficult situation. That is why I have pointed out the importance of integration processes, the importance of strengthening the peoples of the third world, against what may be the interests of the two superpowers.

He said that the policy of one of the superpowers must be judged in relation to the policy of the other. We can neither justify nor explain, he said, any attack by either party against the independence, against the sovereignty of peoples, against the free determination of peoples to choose the course that we want.

I think, he emphasized, that in the case of Latin America social change is desired, but a highly democratic form of social change.

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CSO: 3010/1311



## BRIEFS

LIBERAL PARTY SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT--Esmeraldas, 24 Apr--The top leadership of the Ecuadorean Radical Liberal Party, with the party chairman at the head of the delegation, will be in Esmeraldas in order to discuss some important issues with provincial liberal leaders, including the liberal youth cadres in Esmeraldas among these issues. The political situation of Ecuador now suggests some interesting possibilities, concerning the gestures and contacts which the government may make to some political groups in order to obtain their cooperation. Just a few hours ago there were reports of a possible understanding between the regime headed by the attorney Jaime Roldos and the Liberal Party. The head of the provincial council of this party, Antonio Merchan, who is now acting mayor of the town of Esmeraldas, told "Ecuadoradio" that a large assembly will be held on Saturday morning, at which time the leaders of the liberal youth will be installed in office. This group will be headed by Simon Guinonez. The provincial party leaders have taken the necessary steps for this assembly with the canton, parish, and neighborhood authorities. To be present at this ceremony are: Dr. Ignacio Hidalgo Villavicencio, top director of the Liberal Party, the deputy director Daniel Alvarez Tenorio, and other party leaders. Mr Merchan added that on the subject of the rapprochement of the Liberal Party with the government, it is felt that this is taking place, and that contacts have been made with the regime of President Roldos. The provincial leadership of Esmeraldas believes that the Liberal Party should cooperate with the government in order to stabilize it and to help it. He emphasized that "a broad-based political party such as ours cannot refuse to work with the democratic government of President Jaime Roldos." [Text] [Quito EL COMERCIO in Spanish 25 Apr 81 p A-2] 7679

## CONDITIONS OF U.S. AID TO EL SALVADOR VIEWED

PA290105 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 20 May 81 p 2

["National Events" column: "An Untenable Condition"]

[Text] The U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee recently approved a resolution under which U.S. military aid to El Salvador must be conditioned to El Salvador's "progress" in the area of respect for the democratic precepts on individual rights. The committee's action, of course, does not carry the weight of a law until both legislative houses ratify that requisite, something that will happen, if the proponents obtain the necessary votes, after next year's budget is approved. There is no certainty that this will happen. On the one hand, President Reagan does not like the idea of a restriction and his influence is now sufficiently powerful to get the support of a majority of representatives. On the other hand, not many deputies are willing to endorse a condition the political intentions of which is so obvious, judging by the way in which the leftist militants have received and are taking advantage of the first reports.

The idea is to hinder the Salvadoran Government's military efforts to defeat the national and international guerrillas that want to establish in that country a Castroite model, like the one established in Nicaragua. That hindrance could lead to either a guerrilla victory or an indefinite prolongation of the struggle, which would force the government to give in to international pressures and bow to the rebels. If the government junta's supply of war materiel is curbed, the junta would be placed in an inferior situation, since the guerrillas have continued to receive powerful weapons through Nicaragua, while Spadafora has announced in Mexico that he plans to send mercenaries in to reinforce the rebels' positions. The U.S. houses must consider all these matters before turning the above-mentioned rule into a law.

President Reagan's view is that the Salvadoran insurrection constitutes a military problem and must be resolved militarily. That means that as long as the country is engaged in an internal struggle, that is, until the situation becomes stabilized and the government junta's position is reaffirmed, it is not pertinent to either demand reforms or subordinate the junta's actions to respect for human rights, which the other side is trampling at will. The government's actions are condemned, while the other side's crimes, attacks and violence are condoned by being ignored. Efforts are being made to institutionalize an absurd situation. Who has ever heard those who supply the guerrillas say that their aid is conditioned to the

latter's respect for the rights of citizens, whether or not committed to the struggle? Or when have the zealous advocates of those rights throughout the world protested over the outrages the guerrillas commit under the pretext of securing the happiness and welfare of the peoples? To the astonishment of those not committed, the excuse might be that such is the price of the promised liberation...

These paradoxical conditions will turn even more uncomfortable now that the new French socialist government is going to enter the contest. The new president has already announced--as if this were the most important thing for the French people--that he will give all his support to the revolutionary process in El Salvador and, in general, in the entire area. This announcement led the Mexican president to note exultantly that there are many points of agreement between the French president's future actions and those of his government. This view was later expanded by his foreign secretary, who said that the Central American revolutionary cause will be favored with the new French Government's interference.

These clear signals will not go unnoticed by the U.S. representatives once they learn about this proposal, which is embarrassing to the military aid program for El Salvador. The conservative majority--both democrats and conservatives--that made it possible to approve President Reagan's economic plan, with the democrats ignoring party discipline, might function once again. It is only in such cases that the representatives duly fulfill their function. Voting while strictly abiding by the group's dictates twists the principle of popular representation. A legislator must act in accordance with his conscience and his concept of the common good, rather than by abiding by factional interests. This is what a large number of democratic deputies did when they approved Reagan's program, and this is how they should act when the law on foreign aid and the above mentioned rider are submitted to the plenum, in order to honor the mandate invested upon them during the past elections.

CSO: 3010/1414

DUVALIER DISCUSSES 'BOAT PEOPLE', DEMOCRACY, ECONOMY

Port-au-Prince LE PETIT SAMEDI SOIR in French 25 Apr-1 May 81 pp 9-13

[Interview: Petit Samedi Soir interview with Duvalier]

[Text] But we wonder if defending this authority should be done at the expense of law and justice. In other words, I mean that the legalist and democrat which you wish to be (in the eyes of history) has been criticized for preferring to banish the majority of the accused of 28 November instead of judging them by the fundamental charter. Is this accusation just, Mr. President?

M.J.C.D.: Isn't it also from a legalist and democratic position that you are making a case against me? Some of my decisions are occasionally based on political sociology whose particularities cannot be forgotten. But whenever the regulations of our Fundamental Charter take preference, my political decisions will adhere to them.

L.P.S.S.: May I ask, Mr. President, if, on the occasion of the celebration of the first decade of Jeanclaudism, you are considering a pardon for the 28 November exiles?

MJCD: It would be premature to consider such a measure of clemency on the occasion of the celebration of the first decade of Jeanclaudism.

LPSS: The Haitian opposition questions the democratic nature of your regime by saying that you harass the Haitian press. How would you answer this, Mr. President?

MJCD: Have you at Petit Samedi Soir ever felt frustrated in your desire to exercise the right of freedom of expression in the service of your country? Have you ever, at such times, felt the slightest threat to the existence of your paper? Can't it be said that the government has extended its tolerance, at certain times and as regards freedom of expression, to the point of raising justified fears in a large portion of the country? For proof I can cite the audacities and extravagances of article, pamphlets, photographs, and editorials of the written and spoken media which were banned only when the media's actions became a provocation to the government and a threat to the public order. Has the slightest penalty ever been taken against any media organization which used the right of freedom of expression to make constructive criticism without the intent to destabilize our institutions?

These are some points which I offer for reflection to the Haitian opposition which questions the democratic nature of the regime which I have decided to defend no matter what the cost.

LEPOT: Many of your staff (and this is more likely a Latin-American phenomenon) tend to think that social movements are symptomatic of political defiance linked to international communism when in fact they often reflect social demands of workers who must deal with intransigent employers. Mr. President, how will Jeanclaudism confront the coming decade so as to stifle these demands for social change, which are indispensable in any system of government of the people, by the people and for the people?

MICHEL: It is easy to see how a rash approach to this "Latin-American phenomenon" has provoked repressive reactions in certain regimes one after the other and the worst atrocities in peaceful democracies.

We have hoped to avoid these excesses which we have frequently noted in Latin America and the Caribbean. Our statesman's perceptiveness enables us to detect false motives in our political analyses and we have made a special effort to avoid belated actions which favor violence over law and justice.

And here, as we understand it, is an explanation of Jeanclaudism, based on its revolutionary antecedents:

Jeanclaudism was inspired by the ideals of the 1946 revolution, as expressed in its concise motto: "The Greatest Good to the Greatest Number."

It has kept Duvalierism as a national doctrine and as a fundamental ideological reference within the framework of National Unity.

Jeanclaudism is an authentic incarnation of Duvalierism, which excludes any antagonism between the two stages of the same revolution for power, but which includes a new goal: "General Well-Being."

LEPOT: Mr. President, what is your government doing to protect the burgeoning Haitian industry from being pushed out of the marketplace by similar imported products? We have in mind the daily paper LE NATIN's denunciation of the black market, which is ruining Haitian finances.

MICHEL: The thrust of the latest economic measures and the reinforcement of certain key institutions' structures reflect the interest of the administration in protecting our fledgling national industry and in undertaking an effective fight against smuggling and black market. As you know, austerity measures often have a negative effect on the people's interests. As part of the program to reestablish industry, the necessity of reconverting in order to benefit popular organizations hit by recent commercial restrictions has not escaped us.

LEPOT: In Haiti, one of the most significant and current problems is that of the "lost people" and of Haitian sugar cane cutters in the Dominican Republic. Mr. President, I would like to ask you what the position of the Haitian Government is, since it should be quite concerned by these afflictions which damage the image of the country and the government and which expose our citizens to terrible miseries on foreign soil.

MICHEL: The migratory phenomenon in Haiti is composed of two distinct aspects which should not be confused in one interpretation.



Let's first consider what has generally been called the "Boat People" and "Canter." This involves clandestine traffic which has for some time taken on alarming proportions and, in certain instances, creates abominable situations, because the ocean separates us from the countries of destination. However, for certain neighboring countries with whom we have a common border, similar and equally tragic migrations take place without raising any clamor, although involving the same pattern of causes and miseries.

My administration, which in no way accepts this phenomenon as inevitable, is already checking these outward migrations by means of courageous negotiations and energetic intervention coupled with an extremely severe legislation and a stiffer internal control.

As far as the causes of this phenomenon go, they are unfortunately part of the larger problem of development: demographic pressures, the hold over agricultural lands, landless peasants, unemployment, etc.

These constitute several worrisome situations which we find at the root of the problem and which fuel our daily search for solutions and contacts in this debate which is of interest to all.

Let's go on to the second aspect of our migratory phenomenon, that of our sugarcane cutters.

This was already a problem of national significance during the decade 1920-1930, in the midst of a period of abundance. It gave birth to the "Viejos" and to the heroic faction of Haitians who made quite a contribution to Castro's revolution and who helped build the economic prosperity of former regimes.

So it is not a recent phenomenon. Neither is it a typically Haitian phenomenon. Let us not forget that in Europe there is a great deal of movement by workers between countries with common borders, or between countries who have joined in a regional economic system.

The degree of dignity and of safeguards which we seek in our hiring contracts and the cooperation of our present partners in observing a just and strict application of their obligations, especially regarding work conditions, are some of the conditions which my administration has imposed to settle the future of this tradition of good neighborliness among all concerned.

LPSS: There are persistent rumors regarding an upcoming devaluation of the gourde. Is this measure based on an initiative of your administration or was it imposed during the present crisis by the International Monetary Fund? In either case, Mr. President, do you think that such a measure is necessary at the present time?

MJCD: There has never been any question about any devaluation whatsoever of the gourde.

LPSS: Merchants are complaining that they are unable to obtain foreign currency to import goods. Is this due to restrictions imposed by the Central Bank or is it simply a consequence of our economy's non-productivity?



MJCD: The lack of foreign currency is a result of the economic situation. The government's economic recovery measures regarding the balance of payments are relying primarily on the following factors to improve the situation:

Mitigate the effects of imports inflation by a timely application of price controls on imported products.

Reduce the consumption of imported goods by the public sector through practicing austerity in such outlays.

Produce the same effect in the private sector by adopting selective measures of restriction against imported luxury items and, at the same time, by protecting the national production of similar goods which the Haitian consumer ignores through snobbishness or indifference.

Increase the production of exportable foodstuffs which were affected by hurricane Allen.

All these measures aim to reduce the outflow of foreign currency and to increase its inflow.

They were proposed, discussed and adopted in council by the Secretaries of State.

LPSS: The government has just raised the debt ceiling by 750 million gourdes. In the present situation, don't you think that this recourse to paper money will only depreciate the gourde even further, since its cover rate in [illegible word] and in foreign currency is becoming less and less?

MJCD: Raising the debt ceiling of the local money encourages a better recycling of national savings and makes money more available for local expenditures. This decision in no way affects foreign currency operations. In addition, its implementation is strictly controlled by the Bank which carefully determined in advance the spread to adopt in this situation.

LPSS: Haiti's future is linked to the development of agriculture. The government has been criticized for not sufficiently encouraging youth who, due to a lack of funds, cannot devote themselves to this type of work. There are, of course, organizations set up for this purpose, but they are so slow that it sometimes takes them 2 or 3 years to review a file before granting even an insignificant loan. Mr. President, shouldn't this be remedied for the sake of agricultural development?

MJCD: Haitian agriculture is based on the small farmer. IDA has in its agricultural fields hundreds of loans granted to small farmers. For larger scale agricultural projects, I know that the eligibility requirements are more stringent than the more liberal treatment which is given to industry or agro-industry, which have larger profit margins. However, beware of echoing those whom the Institute may have saved from certain failure. The credit department is capable of obtaining all the necessary guarantees without, however, causing the applicants harmful delays.

LPSS: After hurricane Allen, there was a decrease in domestic production, an increase in unemployment, a disturbing rise in the price of everyday consumer goods. Mr. President, as chief of state and head of the government, what short and long-term solutions have you proposed to ameliorate this situation?

MJCD: Immediately after hurricane Allen there was a decrease in domestic production (foodstuffs and goods for export) and, consequently, an exaggerated rise in certain prices. This situation continued throughout the intervening period which lasted until the harvests that were part of the emergency program set up to reverse the situation.

As for the spectacular rise in price of everyday agricultural products, it was due, in that particular instance, to the law of supply and demand in a period of shortages, and, more generally, to the inflation which is felt by both farmers and urbanites when buying consumer goods. I wanted to go into the political reasons as much as possible under the circumstances, and be more reticent about agricultural economy, since its analysis is quite complex because of its tight links and relations of cause and effect with the rest of the economy. Because you cannot talk about a single solution, but rather many solutions put forth which could be found in each of the government's general political measures.

I think it would be better for you to have an open debate with our agricultural economists. You could then identify the themes, explore questions as they relate to the present situation and develop the arguments further, which is not possible in this interview.

LPSS: All in all, Mr. President, are you satisfied and happy with the direction of your economic revolution?

MJCD: The hope and confidence of my people remain the only satisfactions which encourage me to continue ever more courageously the long and difficult path of development.

As for its direction, under my leadership no force on earth will cause it to deviate from its guiding principle: "With the support of all in National Unity, but above all, for the benefit of the people."

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